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Bailouts, Time Inconsistency, and Optimal Regulation: 
A Macroeconomic View†
By V. V. Chari and Patrick J. Kehoe*
A common view is that bailouts of firms by governments are needed 
to cure inefficiencies in private markets. We propose an alternative 
view: even when private markets are efficient, costly bankruptcies 
will occur and benevolent governments without commitment will 
bail out firms to avoid bankruptcy costs. Bailouts then introduce 
inefficiencies where none had existed. Although granting the 
government orderly resolution powers which allow it to rewrite 
private contracts improves on bailout outcomes, regulating leverage 
and taxing size is needed to achieve the relevant constrained efficient 
outcome, the sustainably efficient outcome. This outcome respects 
governments’ incentives to intervene when they lack commitment. (JEL D86, E32, G33, H81, L51)
Recent experience has shown that governments can and will intervene during 
financial crises. During such crises, many firms are faced with the prospect of costly 
bankruptcy and liquidation. To minimize these costs, governments bail out firms 
that are on the brink of bankruptcy by purchasing their debt. Governments then 
renegotiate the debt contracts to allow such firms to continue operations without 
having to go through bankruptcy, and pay for such bailouts with taxes.
One view is that costly bankruptcies occur because private markets function 
poorly and that bailouts are needed to remedy inefficiencies in private markets. Here 
we formalize an alternative view that bailouts create rather than cure inefficiencies, 
propose a perspective that builds the incentives of governments without commit-
ment into the efficiency criterion, and evaluate policies that are at the center of the 
current debate on regulating the financial system.
Our alternative view is that even if private markets are efficient, costly bankrupt-
cies would still occur, and  well-meaning governments without commitment would 
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bail out firms in order to avoid bankruptcy costs. Such interventions introduce inef-
ficiencies into otherwise  well-functioning markets.
In analyzing policy, our perspective is that governments in practice lack commit-
ment and, regardless of the laws in place, will find ways to engage in  tax-financed 
bailouts if they find it desirable to do so. This perspective implies that outcomes 
which do not respect the incentives of the government to engage in bailouts are 
unattainable and leads us to label outcomes that do respect these incentives as sus-
tainable. The relevant notion of constrained efficiency, then, is the best outcome that 
respects sustainability as well as the resource and informational constraints in the 
economy. We label such outcomes sustainably efficient.
Our analysis leads to three results. The first is that if the bailout temptation is suf-
ficiently strong, then outcomes with bailouts are sustainably inefficient. The second 
is that an orderly resolution provision which, akin to a provision in the  Dodd-Frank 
Act, grants the government the power to impose losses on unsecured creditors 
improves on bailout outcomes but is sustainably inefficient. The third is that sustain-
ably efficient outcomes can be implemented by granting the government the regu-
latory authority to impose limits on the  debt-to-value ratios and a tax on firm size.
A key insight of our analysis is that regulation should be most stringent when, 
absent intervention, the resources lost to bankruptcy would be the largest. We use 
this insight to determine how regulation should vary over the business cycle as well 
as across industries.
We begin with a simple  one-period model that highlights the time inconsistency 
problem faced by governments. Our model, which uses some features of Townsend 
(1979), has information frictions, and we allow private agents to renegotiate con-
tracts. With these features, private agents optimally choose to enter into  debt-equity 
contracts that specify the size of the firm, as well as payments to debt holders, equity 
holders, and managers. Debt levels are chosen high enough so that the firm enters 
into costly bankruptcy with positive probability. Such bankruptcy plays a dual role: 
it is needed both to provide managers with incentives to exert effort and to opti-
mally extract payments to investors from the firm. These contracts lead to ex ante 
efficient outcomes, and with commitment the government chooses not to intervene. 
Moreover, the ability of private agents to renegotiate contracts implies that the equi-
librium is also ex post efficient.
Even though the equilibrium is ex post efficient, a benevolent government that 
seeks to maximize the sum of agents’ utilities will find it optimal to eliminate all 
impending bankruptcies because doing so raises this sum. The government buys up 
the debt of distressed firms and renegotiates their debt contracts in order to elimi-
nate all bankruptcies. It finances debt purchases by levying taxes on all firms. Such 
a policy introduces a subsidy distortion by effectively subsidizing payments to the 
firm in the event of impending bankruptcy. An individual firm has an incentive to 
increase its likelihood of bankruptcy so as to receive these subsidies because, from 
its perspective, the taxes it pays are not affected by its choices. Of course, in equi-
librium each firm’s expected subsidies equal its expected tax payments. These sub-
sidies thus induce a distortion in effort and size choices even though no external 
funds are used to finance them. This distortion leads welfare to be strictly lower 
than it would be under commitment, and thus our economy has a time inconsistency 
problem.
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The  one-period model is a useful prelude to our main analysis, but it lacks a key 
feature of the data, namely that we observe partial rather than complete bailouts. 
More important, it misses a critical insight into size externalities, which we discuss 
later. Our dynamic model, an infinitely repeated version of the  one-period model, 
addresses both of these deficiencies.
In our dynamic model, reputational considerations impose ex post costs of unex-
pected intervention by affecting private agents’ beliefs about future policies. To see 
how such ex posts costs can arise, suppose that an unexpectedly large bailout today 
leads private agents to expect that all distressed firms will be bailed out in the future. 
Such expectations imply that a bailout authority who is contemplating an unexpect-
edly large bailout may be deterred from doing so, because the current gain from 
reducing bankruptcy may be outweighed by the future losses arising from distor-
tions induced by anticipated bailouts.
We show that such logic implies that equilibrium outcomes respect the incentives 
of the government to intervene if and only if they satisfy a sustainability constraint. 
This constraint requires that the current gains from policy deviations must be out-
weighed by the future losses induced by changes in private expectations from such 
deviations. We show that if the discount factor is not too high, the sustainability 
constraint binds and we have partial bailouts in that the bailout authority bails out 
some but not all firms.
We show that bailout equilibrium outcomes are sustainably inefficient if the sus-
tainability constraint is binding. This inefficiency arises from subsidy distortions 
and size externalities. The subsidy distortions arise for the same reasons as in the 
 one-period model. The size externality, which is present only in the dynamic model, 
arises from a  free-rider problem generated by the sustainability requirement. When 
firms in the aggregate increase their size, the resources lost to bankruptcy increase 
and the bailout authority is more tempted to intervene ex post. Each individual firm 
is made better off if all firms reduce their size below privately optimal levels so that 
the government does not intervene, but no individual firm will agree to do so. At a 
mechanical level, the inefficiency arises because in the sustainability constraint the 
gains to deviation are increasing in the current size of firms.
One proposed remedy reflects the popular view that bailouts lead to inefficiency 
because they subsidize firms that would otherwise go bankrupt. The  Dodd-Frank 
Act contains provisions that reflect this popular view. The key feature of this lengthy 
act, which we refer to as an orderly resolution provision, grants to a governmental 
authority the power to impose losses on unsecured creditors. Our reading of the act 
is that, although the additional powers are intended to dampen the incentives of the 
government to engage in  tax-financed bailouts, in practice the government cannot 
be prevented from engaging in such bailouts in times of severe financial stress if it 
chooses to do so.
We model the orderly resolution provision by granting the bailout authority the 
additional power to force debt holders of firms facing impending bankruptcy to 
accept lower debt payments. We show that armed with this additional power, this 
authority eliminates the subsidy distortions by effectively making each firm pay 
for its own bailouts. It does not eliminate the size externality, however, because 
individual firms do not internalize that the extent of intervention by this authority is 
determined by the size of firms in the aggregate.
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Optimal regulation in the form of a limit on the  debt-to-value ratio and a tax on 
size achieves the sustainably efficient outcome. It eliminates the subsidy distortions 
by eliminating the incentives of the government to conduct bailouts ex post, and it 
eliminates the size externalities by inducing firms to reduce their size.
The general implication of our analysis is that regulation should be most stringent 
when, absent intervention, the resources lost to bankruptcy would be the largest. In 
terms of the cyclicality of regulation, this insight implies that regulation should be 
more stringent in aggregate states for which lost resources are higher, but interest-
ingly, this regulation can be either procyclical or countercyclical depending on the 
details of how aggregate shocks affect the sustainability constraint.
We then use this general implication to analyze which industries should face the 
most stringent regulation. We think of industries as differing in the severity of their 
incentive problems. We show that industries with more severe incentive problems 
have higher  debt-to-value ratios and must be regulated to a greater extent. In this 
sense, our model is consistent with the view that industries with high  debt-to-value 
ratios, such as banking, are most in need of regulation.
Optimal regulation in our model also addresses a type of a  too-big-to-fail prob-
lem. Usual discussions of this problem focus on the idea that individual firms in 
industries such as banking become too large. Since the aggregate loss to bankruptcy 
determines the incentives of the bailout authority to intervene, our analysis suggests 
that the  too-big-to-fail problem is that the industry as a whole becomes too large 
rather than that particular firms within an industry become too large.
In this paper we formalize the view that the inefficiency of bailout outcomes 
arises not from perverse incentives that private agents might have but rather from 
the incentives of  well-meaning governments that cannot commit themselves. To do 
so, we allow private agents to have access to a rich set of contracts and allow these 
agents to optimally adjust their contracts as their expectations of government policy 
change. In particular, we do not restrict our analysis to a fixed set of contracts. We 
purposely do so because analyses of bailouts that restrict themselves to a fixed set of 
suboptimal contracts make it hard to distinguish between regulation that is needed 
to overcome inefficient behavior by private agents arising from restrictions imposed 
on contracts and regulation that is needed to overcome inefficient behavior by gov-
ernments without commitment.
In formalizing this view, we have purposely abstracted from any inefficiencies 
in private markets. These include externalities generated by spillover effects—say, 
from fire sales. A standard story is that when the financial sector undergoes severe 
stress, these stresses spill over to other sectors in a way that is not internalized by the 
market. Such spillovers generate externalities that can be mitigated by regulation. 
Clearly, these spillover externalities have nothing to do with the externalities gen-
erated by lack of commitment by the government; regulation is needed even under 
commitment. Obviously, we can add such spillovers to our model. Our analysis can 
be thought of as describing regulation that is needed to address the externalities 
arising from lack of commitment by the government over and above those needed to 
cure standard spillover externalities.
We have also purposely abstracted from the inefficiencies that arise from coordi-
nation problems by focusing on the best equilibrium in each policy regime. We have 
abstracted from coordination problems for two reasons. First, we want to focus on 
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the role of regulation in mitigating distortions and externalities arising from a time 
inconsistency problem. Second, our dynamic model has multiple  Pareto-ranked 
equilibria, and regulation cannot cure this multiplicity.
In focusing on the best equilibrium, we follow a long tradition in public finance 
and mechanism design that looks for policies and mechanisms that weakly implement 
desired outcomes. That is, under the constructed policies and mechanisms, the desired 
outcome is one equilibrium among many possible equilibria. The idea is that society 
can somehow find a way to coordinate the desired equilibrium outcome. Note, how-
ever, that even if we follow this tradition, a classic time inconsistency problem remains 
and regulation is desirable. (See Lucas and Stokey 1983 for the classic definition.1)
Related Literature.—The size externality in our model arises because of the fea-
ture that the aggregate size of the capital stock appears in the sustainability con-
straint and, with competitive agents, each individual agent takes this aggregate as 
given when choosing individual capital stocks. This general feature arises in many 
macroeconomic models that have competitive agents and limited commitment by 
the government. See, for example, Marcet and Marimon (1998); Kehoe and Perri 
(2004); Acemoglu, Golosov, and Tsyvinski (2008); Aguiar and Amador (2011); and 
Ales, Maziero, and Yared (2014).
We have motivated our modeling of orderly resolution based on our reading of 
the  Dodd-Frank Act. Another motivation comes from a report by 15 academic econ-
omists (French et al. 2010). These economists propose that regulators institute ways 
to expedite resolution of distressed financial institutions. We show that our orderly 
resolution mechanism captures the spirit of their main proposals.
A paper that is closely related to ours is Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Queralto (2012). 
They develop a model in which a  macroprudential policy that subsidizes equity 
finance ameliorates a pecuniary externality. As in our work, the  debt-equity ratios of 
banks are determined, in part, by expectations of the extent of government interven-
tion. Unlike our paper, the government intervention policy is not optimally deter-
mined given the decisions of private agents. Thus, their paper does not address the 
central question in our paper: the extent to which regulation is needed to cure the 
externalities generated by time inconsistency problems.
In interesting related work, Farhi and Tirole (2012) analyze the role of regulation 
in addressing a coordination problem. Absent regulation, without commitment their 
model has multiple equilibria, one of which coincides with the equilibrium under 
commitment. Regulation can uniquely implement the commitment equilibrium. 
Since the commitment equilibrium is also an equilibrium without commitment, their 
model does not have a classic time inconsistency problem in the sense of Lucas and 
Stokey (1983). Hence, if we applied the traditional weak implementation approach 
to their model, we would conclude that regulation is unnecessary. More import-
ant, their model does not have bailouts that involve purchases of debt by the gov-
ernment accompanied by forgiveness. Thus, they cannot analyze the role of  policy 
1 Recall from Lucas and Stokey (1983) that a Ramsey plan starting at date  0, thought of as the best equilibrium 
with commitment, is time consistent if, taking as given the history of policies and private allocations from the date 0 
plan, a Ramsey planner at any future date  t ≥ 1 would choose to continue with the date 0 plan. If the Ramsey plan 
does not have this property, then the economy has a time inconsistency problem. 
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 interventions, such as orderly resolution, that force unsecured creditors to absorb 
losses. (It is worth noting that the model in Farhi and Tirole 2012 has the feature that 
there is a unique equilibrium under commitment, but additional, inferior equilibria 
appear when the government does not have commitment. Hence, the coordination 
problem is connected to the lack of commitment by the government.)
Other interesting related work is that by Keister (2014), who studies the role of 
bailouts in a Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model. Keister’s model also has multiple 
equilibria, and the best equilibrium without commitment coincides with the commit-
ment equilibrium. In this sense, Keister also does not have a time inconsistency prob-
lem, and the commitment outcome can be weakly implemented without regulation.
Our paper is closely related to a literature that analyzes the role of bailouts in 
international sovereign debt markets. (See Aguiar and Amador 2014 for a sur-
vey.) Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2001) and Schneider and Tornell (2004) 
emphasize the role that bailouts by domestic governments play in exacerbating 
financial crises. Neither of these papers, however, analyzes the role of regulatory 
policy. A branch of this literature analyzes the role of an international lender of last 
resort, which, during crises, provides funds at a  below-market rate and, in this sense, 
bails out sovereign borrowers. Cole and Kehoe (2000); Conesa and Kehoe (2014); 
Lorenzoni and Werning (2013); and Ayres et al. (2015) show that such a lender can 
play a beneficial role by helping to solve coordination problems. As we have noted, 
solving such coordination problems is not the focus of our analysis.
A burgeoning recent literature gives a prominent role to regulation as the way 
to correct pecuniary externalities arising either from lack of commitment by pri-
vate agents or from hidden trading. (See, for example, the work of Lorenzoni 2008; 
Farhi, Golosov, and Tsyvinski 2009; Bianchi and Mendoza 2010; Bianchi 2011; and 
Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Queralto 2012.) In contrast, in our work, a subtle externality 
arises because of lack of commitment by the government.
Here we have derived these results using a variant of the model in Townsend 
(1979). We conjecture that similar results could be derived in variants of the models 
in Harris and Raviv (1990) and Holmström and Tirole (1998).
Our paper also builds on the insightful discussion of bailouts in Stern and Feldman 
(2004).
I. The  One-Period Economy
We begin with a  one-period economy that sets the stage for our  infinite-horizon 
analysis. We describe the key frictions in the economy, solve for the optimal con-
tracts, and show that the competitive equilibrium is both ex ante and ex post efficient. 
We then introduce a government and show that without commitment, governments 
engage in bailouts and the resulting equilibria are sustainably inefficient. Finally, we 
show that an orderly resolution authority implements sustainably efficient outcomes.
A. With Only Private Agents
We begin by considering a  one-period economy without a government. In this econ-
omy, managers and investors design optimal contracts that are intended to induce effort 
and share output in the face of three key frictions. First, the effort of the  manager is 
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privately observed by the manager. Second, although the manager costlessly observes 
a component of productivity, labeled private, investors can observe this component 
only by putting the firm through bankruptcy. We assume that bankruptcy is costly in 
that it reduces the output of firms proportionately. Third, the manager and the investors 
cannot commit to the terms of their contracts; that is, they can renegotiate the terms 
of a contract after the manager chooses effort. This ability to renegotiate implies that 
the contract is ex post efficient in the sense that there is no incentive feasible way to 
make all agents better off ex post. We allow for private renegotiation to ensure that the 
ex post gains from bailouts do not arise from a desire to improve ex post efficiency.
We allow investors and managers to sign any contracts as long as they respect 
the informational and renegotiation constraints of the environment. We show that 
the optimal contracts are  debt-equity contracts, and under sufficient conditions have 
costly bankruptcy. We also show that the resulting competitive equilibrium is ex ante 
efficient in that a planner, confronted with the same information and renegotiation 
frictions, would choose the same outcomes.
Setup and Characterization of the Competitive Equilibrium.—In the model, deci-
sions are made in two stages: a first stage at the beginning of the period and a sec-
ond stage at the end. The economy has two types of agents, called managers and 
investors, both of whom are risk neutral and consume at the end of the period. The 
economy has a measure  1 of managers and a measure 1 of investors.
The technology uses two inputs in the first stage, an investment of  k units of goods 
per manager and effort  p by the manager, to produce output at the second stage. The 
effort level  p of any individual manager is unobserved by other agents in the economy.
The amount of output produced in the second stage stochastically depends on 
the effort level  p , the amount of investment  k , two idiosyncratic shocks denoted 
 A s and  ε , and a bankruptcy decision. The shock  A s ,  s ∈ { H, L} , determines the aver-
age level of productivity and is called the health status. It is publicly observed at no 
cost. We refer to  A H as the healthy state and  A L as the distressed state. These shocks 
satisfy  A H >  A L . With probability  p H = p the healthy state is realized, and with 
complementary probability  p L = 1 − p the distressed state is realized.
The shock  ε is privately observed by the manager and is made public only if the 
firm declares bankruptcy, as described later. We assume that  ε has density  h s (ε) and 
distribution  H s (ε) with mean  1 and support  [  ε _s ,  ε ̅s ] . The idiosyncratic shocks  A s and ε are realized after the effort level is chosen and are independently and identically 
distributed across firms.
After the shocks have been realized, the firm can choose whether to declare bank-
ruptcy. If it does not declare bankruptcy, output is given by  A s εg(k) for  s ∈ { H, L} , 
where  g(k) is an increasing concave function. If the firm declares bankruptcy, then 
it is monitored, and the idiosyncratic shock  ε becomes publicly known. Monitoring 
is costly in that output is then given by  R  A s εg(k) , where  R < 1 .
Let  B s denote the bankruptcy set, namely, the set of idiosyncratic shocks  ε such 
that the firms declare bankruptcy when the health state is  s ∈ { H, L}. The comple-
mentary set in which no bankruptcy occurs is denoted  N s .2
2 Throughout, we restrict attention to deterministic monitoring. For analyses with stochastic monitoring, see 
Townsend (1979) and Mookherjee and Png (1989). 
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Managers have no endowments of goods but do have the specialized skills needed 
to operate the technology. Investors have  ω units of endowments but do not have 
these specialized skills. Investors choose how much to invest in the technology and 
can store the rest of their endowments at rate 1. The only role of storage is to pin 
down the opportunity costs of funds to be 1. We assume that  ω is sufficiently large 
so that some amount of the endowment is always stored. We also assume that the 
technology is sufficiently attractive so that it is always active.
Investors invest with competitive financial intermediaries who enter into contracts 
with a continuum of managers. Given that all investors are identical, we can restrict 
attention to a representative financial intermediary who behaves competitively.
A contract between the representative financial intermediary and a given man-
ager specifies the size of the firm, the recommended effort level for the manager, 
the consumption level of the manager, payments to the financial intermediary, and 
the bankruptcy set. By symmetry we can restrict attention to a representative con-
tract. Let  C s (ε) denote the consumption of the managers when the health state is 
 s ∈  {H, L} and the idiosyncratic shock is  ε . Managers are risk neutral over consump-
tion. Their disutility from effort depends on  p H = p , is proportional to the size of 
the project  g(k) , and is given by  v(  p H )g(k) , where  v(  p H ) is an increasing convex 
function. Thus, the manager’s utility function is given by
(1)  ∑ 
s
   p s  ∫     C s (ε) d  H s (ε) − v(  p H )g(k). 
The consumption of the managers must satisfy a nonnegativity constraint  C s (ε) ≥ 0. 
Investors invest their endowment  ω with the representative financial intermediary. 
This intermediary invests  k units with each firm and stores  ω − k units. Let  D s (ε) 
denote the payments a firm with idiosyncratic shocks  s and  ε makes to the financial 
intermediary. Since the representative financial intermediary enters into contracts 
with a continuum of managers, we can invoke the law of large numbers and obtain 
that the deterministic payoff to the representative financial intermediary, and hence 
to the investors it represents, is
(2)  ∑ 
s
   p s   ∫     D s (ε) d  H s (ε) + ω − k. 
The financial intermediary maximizes (2).
When the firm does not declare bankruptcy, the firm’s resource constraint is
(3)  C s (ε) +  D s (ε)  =  A s εg(k),  
and when the firm does declare bankruptcy, the firm’s resource constraint is
(4)  C s (ε) +  D s (ε)  = R  A s εg(k). 
Thus, the overall budget constraint of the financial intermediary is that the sum 
of the consumption of managers and the (deterministic) consumption of investors 
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associated with the payoffs from the financial intermediary be no more than the 
output produced including stored endowments:
(5)  ∑ 
s
  p s [ ∫     C s (ε) d  H s (ε)] +  ∑ s  p s  ∫     D s (ε) d  H s (ε) + ω − k 
    ≤  ∑ 
s
  p s [ ∫  N s  
 
 A s ε d  H s (ε) +  ∫  B s  
 
 R  A s ε d  H s (ε)] g(k) + ω − k. 
A representative contract consists of  x = { k, p,  C s (ε),  D s (ε),  B s }. Here, effort is 
not observable so it is not directly contractible, but the contract will be designed 
to ensure that the manager exerts the  agreed-upon level of effort. Note that given 
a contract, the consumption of the investors is implied by the resource constraint.
The timing is as follows. The financial intermediary and managers first agree to 
a contract, and then the managers choose their effort level  p . After the effort level 
is chosen, the health status of each firm  s is publicly realized. The intermediary and 
managers then renegotiate the contract. Finally, the idiosyncratic shocks  ε are real-
ized, and the bankruptcy decisions are made according to the renegotiated contract.
To be part of a competitive equilibrium, a contract has to satisfy various condi-
tions. Consider the conditions that must be satisfied after  k and  p are chosen. One is 
that any contract must be incentive compatible with respect to reporting the shock  ε ; 
that is, a manager must prefer to report the idiosyncratic shock  ε truthfully rather 
than misreport it. A manager with a shock  ε in the nonbankruptcy set must not have 
an incentive to misreport any other shock  ε ̂ in this nonbankruptcy set, so that
(6)  C s (ε)  =  A s εg(k)  −  D s (ε)  ≥  A s εg(k)  −  D s ( ε ̂) for all ε ∈  N s ,  ε ̂ ∈  N s . 
This constraint implies that for all  ε ∈  N s , payments to the financial intermedi-
ary  D s (ε) are constant in the nonbankruptcy set at some level, denoted  D s . Using 
this result, since a manager with a shock  ε in the bankruptcy set must not have an 
incentive to misreport any  ε ̂ in the nonbankruptcy set, we have
(7)  C s (ε)  = R  A s εg(k)  −  D s (ε)  ≥  A s εg(k)  −  D s  for all ε ∈  B s ,  ε ̂ ∈  N s . 
(Of course, it is not feasible for the agent to claim some  ε ̂ in the bankruptcy set, 
since that report will be monitored.)
A contract is incentive feasible if it is incentive compatible in that it satisfies (6) 
and (7), and resource feasible in that it satisfies the resource constraints (3) and (4) 
and the nonnegativity constraint on the manager’s consumption.
Since we allow the financial intermediary and the managers to renegotiate con-
tracts, we can restrict attention to contracts with the property that no renegotiation 
occurs. Before renegotiation begins, a particular representative contract  x has been 
agreed to, effort level  p has been chosen, and health shocks  s have been realized for 
all the firms. Thus, at the time of renegotiation there are managers at healthy firms, 
managers at distressed firms, and the financial intermediary.
A contract  x = { k, p,  C s (ε),  D s (ε),  B s } is immune to renegotiation given  k and  p 
if it is incentive feasible and no alternative continuation contract  { C ˆ s (ε),   D ˆ s (ε),  B ˆs } 
exists that is incentive and resource feasible, and makes managers of both healthy 
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and distressed firms and the financial intermediary better off, with at least one of 
these three groups strictly better off. That is, given  k and  p , a continuation contract 
{ C ˆ s (ε),  D ˆ s (ε),  B ˆs } does not exist that satisfies the resource and incentive constraints (3)–(7) and makes managers of both healthy and distressed firms and the financial 
intermediary better off:
(8)  ∫     C ˆ s (ε) d  H s (ε) ≥  ∫     C s (ε) d  H s (ε)  ≡  C –s for s = H, L 
(9)  ∑ 
s
  p s   ∫     D ˆ s (ε) d  H s (ε) ≥  ∑ s  p s  ∫     D s (ε) d  H s (ε) ≡  ∑ s  p s  D –s ,
where  D 
–
s =  ∫     D s (ε) d  H s (ε) with at least one of these inequalities strict.
To help interpret the implications of immunity to renegotiation, consider the situ-
ation of a financial intermediary after  k and  p have been chosen and the health shock 
s has been realized for all firms. The original contract  x specifies the continuation 
( C H (ε),  D H (ε),  B H ) for healthy firms and  ( C L (ε),  D L (ε),  B L ) for distressed firms. In 
the renegotiation stage, the financial intermediary can propose any alternative con-
tinuation contract  ( C ˆ H (ε),  D ˆ H (ε),  B ˆH ) for healthy firms and  ( C ˆ L (ε),  D ˆ L (ε),  B ˆL ) for 
distressed firms. This alternative continuation contract will be accepted by managers 
of healthy firms and distressed firms if it satisfies (8) and will be proposed by the 
financial intermediary if it satisfies (9). Note that this way of modeling renegotiation 
allows for  cross-subsidization between healthy and distressed firms. In principle, the 
financial intermediary can simultaneously adjust the bankruptcy sets and receipts of 
both healthy and distressed firms to minimize bankruptcy costs as long as the total 
receipts from all firms do not decrease, and the managers accept the renegotiated 
contracts.
We now turn to the ex ante optimal contract in our economy. We think of manag-
ers as offering contracts. The financial intermediary will accept the contract as long 
as the expected rate of return on their investment is at least 1. Thus, any contract 
must satisfy the participation constraint
(10)  ∑ 
s
  p s  ∫     D s (ε) d  H s (ε)  ≥ k ,
as well as the resource constraints (3) and (4). The contract must also give the man-
ager the incentive to exert the intended level of effort  p and thus must satisfy the 
effort incentive constraint
(11)  p =  p H ∈  arg max  p H   ∑ s  p s  ∫     C s (ε) d  H s (ε)  − v(  p H )g(k). 
Since all contracts can be renegotiated after the manager has chosen effort, 
when defining an equilibrium, it suffices to consider contracts that are immune to 
renegotiation.
A contract is implementable if it satisfies the participation constraint, (10), satis-
fies the manager’s effort incentive constraint, (11), and is immune to renegotiation. 
Note that in this definition, the requirement that contracts be immune to renegotia-
tion incorporates the incentives to report  ε truthfully, so we do not need to add (6) 
and (7) as separate constraints.
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A competitive equilibrium consists of a contract  x that maximizes the manager’s 
utility over the set of implementable contracts.3
We now turn to the ex ante efficiency of a competitive equilibrium. A contract  x is 
ex ante efficient if it is implementable and no alternative implementable contract  x′ 
exists that makes all managers and the financial intermediary better off, with at least 
one manager or the financial intermediary being made strictly better off.
A contract  x is ex post efficient if, given that the firm size  k and the effort level 
p have been chosen, no alternative continuation contract exists that is immune to 
renegotiation.
The following proposition is immediate.
PROPOSITION 1: The competitive equilibrium is both ex ante and ex post efficient.
We now turn to characterizing the competitive equilibrium. We do so by working 
backward from the end of the period in two stages. Once effort and size have been 
chosen, we show that only contracts with a simple form are immune to renegotia-
tion. Given the simple form of contracts, we then move back to the ex ante stage and 
solve the contracting problem.
Here, bankruptcy plays a dual role. At the renegotiation stage, bankruptcy is used 
to induce the manager to pay more than a minimal amount, whereas at the ex ante 
stage, the level of bankruptcy is used to induce the manager to exert the optimal 
amount of effort.
At the renegotiation stage, size and effort have been chosen and our framework 
is, by design, similar to that in Townsend (1979). In Proposition 2 we show that a 
contract is immune to renegotiation if and only if it has a simple form, labeled a 
 debt-equity contract for reasons discussed later.
Here we describe a  debt-equity contract. We do so by considering a contract 
with expected payments in state  s given by  U s = ( C –s ,  D –s ) defined in (8) and (9). In 
renegotiating a contract, the parties seek to minimize bankruptcy costs while ensur-
ing that the managers and the financial intermediary receive at least the expected 
amounts promised under the original contract in that state. In the proof, we show 
that this reasoning implies that if this contract is immune to renegotiation, it spec-
ifies a bankruptcy cutoff  ε s ∗ in each state. If  ε s is greater than  ε s ∗, then the firm does 
not declare bankruptcy, the payments to the financial intermediary are constant, and 
the manager receives all of the residual output. If, instead,  ε s is less than  ε s ∗, then 
the firm declares bankruptcy, the financial intermediary receives all of the reduced 
output, and the manager’s consumption is zero.
Specifically, if the expected payments to the financial intermediary are suffi-
ciently low, in that  D 
–
s ≤  A s  ε _s g(k) , it is incentive feasible to meet these payments 
without monitoring so that the contract has no bankruptcy. The consumption of the 
manager is then given by  C s (ε)  =  A s εg(k)  −  D –s , and the payoff to the financial 
intermediary for each  ε is  D –s .
3 Here, in a competitive equilibrium managers offer contracts to investors. An alternative way of setting up the 
equilibrium is to have the financial intermediaries offer contracts to managers—contracts that maximize expected 
profits subject to the incentive constraints, feasibility constraints, and participation constraints on managers. 
Competition between financial intermediaries drives their profits to zero so that the return on these contracts equals 
that on storage. By duality, these two setups yield equivalent outcomes. 
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If instead  D 
–
s >  A s  ε _s g(k) , it is not incentive feasible to meet these payments with-
out monitoring so that bankruptcy is necessary. Then a cutoff  ε s ∗ exists such that the 
contract has bankruptcy for  ε ≤  ε s ∗, the payments to the financial intermediary are 
given by
(12)  D s (ε)  =  {  D s =  A s  ε s 
∗ g(k) for ε ≥  ε s 
∗,   
R  A s εg(k) for ε <  ε s ∗ } ,  
and the consumption of the manager is given by  C s (ε)  =  A s εg(k)  −  D s for  ε >  ε s ∗
and  C s (ε)  = 0 for  ε ≤  ε s ∗. Given a cutoff  ε s ∗, any such contract induces expected 
payments to the financial intermediary in state  s of
(13)  D –s ( ε s ∗) =  [R  A s  ∫  ε _ ε s ∗ εd  H s (ε) +  A s  ε s ∗  ∫  ε s ∗  ε ̅s  d  H s (ε)] g(k) 
and expected consumption of the manager in state  s of
(14)  C –s (  ε s ∗) =  [ A s  ∫  ε s ∗  ε ̅s  (ε −  ε s ∗)d  H s (ε)] g(k). 
At the renegotiation stage, the model has the following tension: any change in 
the bankruptcy cutoff drives the payments to managers and the financial interme-
diary in opposite directions. This tension determines the bankruptcy cutoff  ε s ∗. To 
determine this cutoff, it is convenient to consider the scaled payments to the man-
ager  c s ( ε s ∗) =  C –s ( ε s ∗)/g(k) and the financial intermediary  d s ( ε s ∗) =  D –s ( ε s ∗)/g(k) . It 
is immediate from (14) that the scaled payments to the manager are decreasing in 
the bankruptcy cutoff. We will assume that  d s ( ε s ∗) is  single-peaked in  ε s ∗ in that it 
first increases and then decreases in  ε s ∗. This assumption holds for a wide variety of 
distribution functions  H s (ε) including the uniform distribution, as long as  R is suffi-
ciently close to 1. Let  ε s, max be the bankruptcy cutoff that maximizes the scaled pay-
ments to the financial intermediary in state  s , namely  d s ( ε s ∗) . We can think of  d s ( ε s ∗) 
as a debt Laffer curve and display it in panel A of Figure 1.
Immunity to renegotiation implies that the bankruptcy cutoff must be to the left 
of the Laffer curve’s peak in that  ε s ∗ ≤  ε s, max . To see why, note that the payments to 
managers, displayed in panel B of Figure 1, are strictly decreasing in the bankruptcy 
cutoff. Thus, if the cutoff were to the right of the Laffer curve peak, then it is possi-
ble to reduce the cutoff and make both the manager and the financial intermediary 
better off.
Inspection of Figure 1 shows that if required payments to the financial interme-
diary are larger than  d s ( ε ¯s ), the only way of meeting these required payments is by having bankruptcy. The reason is that bankruptcy, along with the associated mon-
itoring, is the only incentive compatible way for investors to receive their required 
payments from the firm. Absent bankruptcy, the manager would always claim that 
the worst idiosyncratic state  ε s has been realized.
The following proposition and others, except where specified, are proved in the 
online Appendix.
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PROPOSITION 2: A contract is immune to renegotiation if and only if it is a 
 debt-equity contract, in that it has the form given in (12), where  ε s ∗ is the cutoff for 
bankruptcy and  ε s ∗ ≤  ε s, max .
The proof is similar to that in Townsend (1979). This proposition says that with-
out loss of generality, we can restrict attention to such  debt-equity contracts.
Here we have assumed that the financial intermediary and managers can renegoti-
ate their contracts immediately before the idiosyncratic shock  ε is realized. It should 
be clear that if we allowed a second renegotiation phase after the idiosyncratic shock 
is realized, incentive compatibility implies that no renegotiation will take place.
As with our scaling of our payments to the financial intermediary, we find it con-
venient to let  y s (  ε s ∗) denote the scaled value of expected output in state  s given by
  y s ( ε s ∗) = R  A s  ∫  ε _s   ε s ∗ ε d  H s (ε)  +  A s  ∫  ε s ∗  ε ̅s  ε d  H s (ε), 
and note that the scaled expected consumption of the manager in state  s is
(15)  c s ( ε s ∗) =  A s  ∫  ε s ∗  ε ̅s  (ε −  ε s ∗) d  H s (ε) 
if  ε s ∗ >  ε _s , and if  ε s ∗ =  ε _s the scaled expected consumption in state  s is a constant  c s 
that satisfies
(16)  c s ≥  c s ( ε ¯s ) =  A s (1 −  ε _s ). 
The inequality (16) arises because when there is no bankruptcy in state  s , the lend-
ers cannot receive an amount larger than  A s  ε _s but can receive less than this amount. 
There should be no confusion if, for brevity, we simply refer to  y s (  ε s ∗) ,  c s (  ε s ∗) , 
and  d s (  ε s ∗) as output, consumption, and payments to the financial intermediary, real-
izing that they are all scaled. The scaled variables in the event of no bankruptcy are 
defined analogously. For future use, note that  y s (  ε s ∗) is decreasing in  ε s ∗.
Financial intermediary
Panel A. The debt Laffer curve
d(ϵ∗) cL(ϵ∗)
ϵ ϵ* ϵ* ϵmax ¯˜
Panel B. Managers
ϵ¯ ϵ ϵ* ϵ* ¯˜ ϵ¯
Figure 1. Expected Payments
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For simplicity only, we will assume throughout that no bankruptcy occurs in 
the healthy state and discuss sufficient conditions below. When there is no bank-
ruptcy in the healthy state, the expected output in that state is  A H  ∫  ε _H   ε ̅H  εd  H H (ε)  =  A H , 
since the mean of  ε H is 1. The manager’s expected consumption in this state is  c H 
and must satisfy the constraint (16). Notice that we no longer need the notation 
for  h H ,  H H , and  ε H ∗ . To conserve on notation, we drop the subscript  L on all vari-
ables associated with the distressed state: we let  h(ε) =  h L (ε) ,  H(ε)  =  H L (ε) , 
 [  ε ¯,  ε ̅] = [  ε ¯L ,  ε ̅L ] ,  ε ∗ =  ε L ∗ ,  d(  ε ∗ ) =  d L (  ε L ∗) , and  ε max =  ε L, max .Proposition 2 implies that a competitive equilibrium consists of a  debt-equity 
contract that maximizes the manager’s utility subject to the participation constraint, 
(10), and the manager’s effort incentive constraint, (11). Note that given  (k,  ε ∗ , p,  c H ) 
we can recover the original contract  x = { k, p,  C s (ε),  D s (ε),  B s } by manipulating and 
integrating (3), (4), and (12). Thus, we can summarize a contract by  (k,  ε ∗ , p,  c H ) . 
Given our assumption of no bankruptcy in the healthy state, the contract in a com-
petitive equilibrium solves
(17)  max 
k,  ε ∗ , p,  c H  
  [p  c H + (1 − p)  c L ( ε ∗ ) − v( p)] g(k) 
subject to  ε ∗ ≤  ε max ,
(18)  c H −  c L (  ε ∗ ) =  v ′ (p) 
 (19)  [p(  A H −  c H ) + (1 − p) (  y L (  ε ∗ ) −  c L (  ε ∗ ))] g(k)  ≥ k,  
and the constraint on  c H , namely (16). Here we have assumed that the  first-order 
approach is valid so that we can replace the global effort incentive constraint (11) 
by its local counterpart (18). Moreover, (19) is the rewritten participation constraint 
(10), where we have used the resource constraints and that the contract has the 
 debt-equity form. In what follows, we assume that (16) is not binding and drop it 
from now on.
To understand the determination of the bankruptcy cutoff, note that raising the 
bankruptcy cutoff reduces the objective function by reducing the consumption of 
the manager in the distressed state. Nonetheless, bankruptcy is useful because of its 
two roles. First, increasing the bankruptcy cutoff raises the payments to the financial 
intermediary  d( ε ∗ ) =  y L ( ε ∗ ) −  c L ( ε ∗ ) and thus relaxes the participation constraint. 
Second, increasing the bankruptcy cutoff increases the manager’s incentives to exert 
effort. To see the second role, notice from the manager’s  first-order condition (18) 
that effort  p is increasing in the spread in expected consumption between healthy 
and distressed states  c H −  c L ( ε ∗ ) . Since  c L ( ε ∗ ) is decreasing in  ε ∗ , it follows that a 
higher bankruptcy effort improves effort.4
4 Note that this force makes bankruptcy in the healthy state undesirable. Such bankruptcies reduce output and, 
unlike bankruptcies in the distressed state, worsen incentives. Thus, if the incentive effects are sufficiently strong, 
the optimal contract will have no bankruptcy in the healthy state. 
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We now turn to simplifying the contracting problem. First, we substitute out 
for  c H and combine (18) and (19) into a single constraint called the implementabil-
ity constraint:
(20)  f ( p,  ε ∗ )g(k)  ≥ k,  
where  f ( p,  ε ∗ ) = p [ A H −  c L ( ε ∗ ) − v′(p)] + (1 − p) [ y L ( ε ∗ ) −  c L ( ε ∗ )] . Note that 
an outcome is implementable if and only if it satisfies the implementability con-
straint. In the next lemma we use a duality argument to show that instead of max-
imizing the welfare of the manager, we can equivalently maximize the sum of 
the utilities of the managers and the investors, referred to as the surplus, denoted 
 U( p,  ε ∗ )g(k)  + ω − k , where
(21)  U( p,  ε ∗ ) = p  A H + (1 − p)  y L ( ε ∗ ) − v( p). 
The resulting contracting problem, referred to as the contracting problem with no 
government is given by
(22)  max 
k,  ε ∗ , p
  U( p,  ε ∗ )g(k) + ω − k ,
subject to  ε ∗ ≤  ε max and the implementability constraint (20). The following lemma 
formalizes the duality argument.
LEMMA 1: The competitive equilibrium contracting problem (17) reduces to the 
contracting problem with no government (22).
It is straightforward to show that if the resources lost to bankruptcy from raising 
the bankruptcy cutoff above its minimum value are small, then in any solution to 
the contracting problem, there is bankruptcy in the distressed state in that  ε ∗ >  ε _. 
These lost resources are small if  R is sufficiently close to 1 or if  ε ¯ is sufficiently close to zero. In what follows, we will focus on economies in which there is bank-
ruptcy in the distressed state. In light of these results, we can refer to a contract  x as 
a  three-tuple  (k,  ε ∗ , p) , where the corresponding consumption allocation  c L (  ε ∗ )  is 
obtained from (15) and  c H from ( 18).
In sum, in the competitive equilibrium, optimal contracts imply that many firms 
undergo bankruptcies. These bankruptcies are necessary both to provide the needed 
return to investors and to provide optimal incentives for managers to exert effort.
Discussion.—One question arises: after the manager has exerted effort, why don’t 
the financial intermediary and the managers agree at the renegotiation stage to elim-
inate all bankruptcies, given that bankruptcies by distressed firms clearly lower total 
output to be divided between the financial intermediary and the managers?
The reason can be seen clearly from Figure 1. Since the bankruptcy cutoff is to 
the left of the Laffer curve peak, a reduction in the cutoff reduces the payments 
to the financial intermediaries and, hence, will be rejected by these intermediar-
ies. Even though the output to be shared between the financial intermediary and 
the managers is increased, the informational rent to the managers arising from the 
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 feature that  ε is private information increases by so much that payments to the finan-
cial intermediary are reduced.
One might wonder, is it not possible for the financial intermediary to renego-
tiate contracts so as to increase receipts from the healthy firms in order to subsi-
dize the reduction in receipts from distressed firms in a way that increases its total 
receipts? The answer is no, because the only way the financial intermediary can 
increase receipts in the healthy state is to have managers of healthy firms reduce 
their consumption. These managers will not agree to such a reduction, so the orig-
inal contract is immune to such a renegotiation and no such  cross-subsidization 
is possible.
Finally, we explain why we label our contracts  debt-equity contracts. One inter-
pretation of our contracts is that they are simply contingent debt contracts. We prefer 
the following interpretation. Suppose that  A H is sufficiently large so that  d H >  A L  ε ∗ . 
Then our contract can be implemented by using a combination of uncontingent debt, 
outside equity, and inside equity, thought of as managerial compensation. Let  A L  ε ∗ 
be the face value of debt in both the healthy and distressed states. In the healthy 
state, debt holders receive the face value of their debt, whereas in the distressed state, 
they receive the face value in the event of no bankruptcy and all of output  R  A L ε in 
the event of bankruptcy. The payments to outside equity are given by  d H −  A L  ε ∗ in 
the healthy state and are  0 in the distressed state. The payments to inside equity are 
given by managerial compensation. Given this implementation, for future use note 
that the market value of the debt in the distressed state before the idiosyncratic shock 
ε is realized is  d( ε ∗ ) .
In setting up this implementation, we have in mind that the outside equity holders 
control the firm and have entered into binding contracts with inside equity holders 
and debt holders. Here the contract specifies that if the firm cannot make the face 
value payments to debt holders, the firm is forced into bankruptcy, outside and inside 
equity holders receive zero, and the debt holders become the residual claimants.
B. Adding a Bailout Authority
Here, we introduce a benevolent government in the form of a bailout authority 
and show that with commitment the bailout authority does not intervene, but without 
commitment this authority finds it optimal to eliminate all bankruptcies. The differ-
ence between these policies with and without commitment implies that the bailout 
authority faces a time inconsistency problem.
The bailout authority is in many ways symmetric to private agents. It can partic-
ipate in negotiating alternative contracts, and it faces the same informational con-
straints as the private agents. Three features of the bailout authority play a key role 
in our results. First, the objective function of the bailout authority is the sum of util-
ities of all the agents. Second, negotiations between the bailout authority and firms 
are voluntary. Third, this authority has the power to levy taxes on payments to the 
financial intermediary without their consent.
We begin by analyzing outcomes under commitment in that the bailout authority 
chooses its policies at the beginning of the period and can commit to them. Since 
the contracting problem with no government (22) is to maximize the sum of utilities 
of all agents, it follows that a bailout authority with commitment will choose not to 
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intervene. Thus, the commitment equilibrium outcomes, denoted  k CE ,  ε CE ∗ ,  p CE with 
associated utility level  U CE , are those that solve the contracting problem (22).
We model lack of commitment by having the bailout authority choose its policies 
after the manager’s effort choice has been made and all the shocks have been real-
ized. We show that the bailout authority eliminates all bankruptcies by buying up 
the debt of the distressed firms and levying taxes on the financial intermediary. One 
might wonder why the bailout authority would intervene if the commitment equi-
librium is ex post efficient. The reason is that the bailout authority does not restrict 
itself to  Pareto-improving interventions ex post, but rather intervenes if it can raise 
the sum of utilities of all agents even if it leads some agents to be worse off. Of 
course, since the commitment equilibrium is ex post efficient, then any intervention 
necessarily makes some agents worse off ex post.
We show that in equilibrium managers are made better off by the bailout and 
investors as a whole are made worse off because it is they who have to pay the taxes 
for the bailout. Of course, if we added a third set of agents, say workers, who are 
not party to these contracts but who pay all the taxes for the bailout, then a bailout 
will make both managers and investors better off but the workers worse off because 
of the taxes. In this sense, it is not important for our results that the financial inter-
mediary is worse off ex post, but rather that even though many agents are better off 
ex post, at least one group of agents is worse off.
Formally, the timing in the period is that in the first stage, each firm chooses a 
contract  x. Next, each manager chooses a probability  p . Then the health shock  s for 
each firm is realized. After that, the private agents renegotiate the contract. Then the 
idiosyncratic shocks  ε are realized. Finally, the bailout authority chooses its policy 
after observing the health state of each firm and using the optimal decision rules of 
private agents to infer the effort level of managers.
The bailout authority’s policy  π has three parts: a (scaled) debt purchase offer  d b 
for distressed firms, a renegotiated debt level indexed by  ε b , and a tax rate  τ . Hence, π = ( d b ,  ε b , τ) . The representative financial intermediary has a collection of 
 debt-equity contracts with firms. An individual contract is sold to the bailout author-
ity only if both the financial intermediary and the manager involved in that contract 
agree to accept the bailout offer. If both parties agree to accept the bailout, an action 
denoted by  δ = 1 , the financial intermediary receives  d b and the bankruptcy cutoff 
is set at  ε b . If either party rejects the bailout, denoted by  δ = 0 , the original contract 
is implemented.5
Under this policy the bailout authority offers to purchase debt of distressed firms 
from the financial intermediary for an amount  d b and, for such firms, offers a new 
debt contract for managers, summarized by a bankruptcy cutoff  ε b , and levies a uni-
form tax  τ on receipts of investors scaled by the size of the project  g(k) .
5 Here the bailout authority makes its offer based on its predictions of private agents’ behavior from the private 
agent decision rules. Since all agents are identical, it predicts that all such agents will choose the same contract. This 
way of modeling private agents captures the idea that private agents are competitive (or anonymous). As we discuss 
in Section I of the online Appendix, if the bailout authority could base its offer on each agent’s actual decisions 
rather than on the predicted decisions of the agent, then private agents would not be anonymous and the bailout 
authority could effectively punish private agents in a way that is not consistent with the spirit of our competitive 
setup. 
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It is important to emphasize that the taxes paid by a given financial intermediary are 
independent of whether it accepts or rejects the bailout. These taxes should be thought 
of as paying for the bailouts of all financial intermediaries. Since any given financial 
intermediary has measure zero, its decisions have no effect on its tax payments.
Note that a bailout policy implies that the bailout authority pays  d b to each firm 
and receives payments  d( ε b ). Thus, each firm that accepts the offer can be thought 
of as receiving a subsidy given by  d b − d(  ε b ). This subsidy is financed by taxes on 
all firms. We will show that this subsidy induces a distortion.
We have also assumed that the bailout authority intervenes after the idiosyncratic 
shocks  ε are realized. It is possible to show both here and in the dynamic version of 
the model that the results are identical if we instead assume that the bailout authority 
intervenes before these shocks are realized.
An equilibrium here consists of strategies that are functions of relevant histories 
and are optimal for the bailout authority and for private agents. The strategy for an 
individual firm consists of a contract  x = (k,  ε ∗ , p) and an acceptance policy  δ(x, π) . 
Let  x R = ( k R ,  ε R ,  p R ) denote the representative contract. When the bailout authority 
makes its decision, its strategy consists of a policy  π = ( d b ,  ε b , τ ).
The acceptance policy is given by
(23)  δ(x, π)  =  { 1 if   d b ≥ d(  ε 
∗ ) and   ε b ≤  ε ∗  
0 otherwise
 } . 
That is, the financial intermediary and the manager accept the bailout offer only if 
they are both made weakly better off.
Next we construct the payoffs of the bailout authority. Suppose that the bailout 
offer ( d b ,  ε b ) is accepted in the distressed state. Then in the distressed state, the 
financial intermediary receives  d b and the manager has expected consumption  c L (  ε b ) 
and, in both states, the firm pays taxes  τ . The sum of utilities of the manager and the 
financial intermediary from the contract is  [ U ̃ (  p R ,  ε b ,  d b ) − τ] g( k R ) + ω −  k R where
  U ̃ (  p R ,  ε b ,  d b ) =  p R  A H + (1 −  p R )( d b +  c L ( ε b )) − v(  p R ). 
If the bailout offer ( d b ,  ε b ) is rejected, the sum of utilities of the manager and the 
investors from the contract is given by  U(  p R ,  ε R )g(  k R ) + ω −  k R where the function 
U is defined in (21). The budget constraint of the bailout authority is
(24)  δτg( k R ) = δ (1 −  p R )  [ d b − d( ε b )] g( k R ),  
where  δ = δ(  x R , π) . Thus, the problem of the bailout authority is to choose  π , taking 
the representative contract  x R and the acceptance policy  δ( x R , π) as given, to solve
(25)  max π   [δ ( U ̃ (  p R ,  ε b ,  d b ) − τ) + (1 − δ) U(  p R ,  ε R )] g( k R ) + ω −  k R ,
subject to the budget constraint (24). Substituting for  τ from the budget constraint, 
we can write the problem of the bailout authority as
(26)  max π   [δU(  p R ,  ε b ) + (1 − δ) U(  p R ,  ε R )] g( k R ) + ω −  k R ,  
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taking as given the acceptance policy  δ = δ(  x R , π) and the representative contract.
Consider the problem that a contract  x solves for an individual firm. The firm 
needs to think through what outcomes will occur for the different original contracts 
it specifies. The firm understands that for certain choices of  x, the financial inter-
mediary and the manager will accept the bailout, the financial intermediary will 
receive  d b , and the bankruptcy cutoff  ε b will be implemented, whereas for other 
choices, they will reject the bailout and the original contract will be implemented.
Thus, we can break the contracting problem into two parts. In the first part, the 
firm chooses size  k and effort  p anticipating that the bailout will be accepted in the 
distressed state in that  δ(x, π)  = 1, so that the financial intermediary will receive  d b 
and the bankruptcy cutoff  ε b will be implemented. The implementability constraint 
with bailouts is then given by
(27)  [  f ̃ ( p,  ε b ,  d b ) − τ ] g(k)  ≥ k,  
where  f ̃ ( p,  ε b ,  d b ) = p [ A H −  c L (  ε b ) −  v ′ ( p)] + (1 − p)  d b is the scaled amount 
the intermediary receives before taxes. Note that  f ̃ ( p,  ε b ,  d b ) coincides with 
f ( p,  ε ∗ ) except that in the distressed state, the intermediary receives  d b instead 
of  y L ( ε ∗ ) −  c L ( ε ∗ ) and the manager receives  c L ( ε b ) rather than  c L ( ε ∗ ) .
The contracting problem anticipating acceptance, namely the acceptance con-
tracting problem, is
(28)  max 
k, p 
  [ U ̃ ( p,  ε b ,  d b ) − τ] g(k)  + ω − k,  
subject to (27). Hence, the contracting problem in (28) coincides with that in (22) 
except that in the distressed state, the firm anticipates that it will take the bailout 
offer rather than executing the original contract.
Note, for later, that the two  first-order conditions for  k and  p for problem (28) can 
be summarized in a single condition,
(29)  [ U ̃ ( p,  ε b ,  d b ) − τ]  g ′ (k)  − 1 =   U 
̃ p ( p,  ε b ,  d b )
 _  f ̃ p ( p,  ε b ,  d b ) [ (  f ̃ (p,  ε b ,  d b ) − τ)  g ′ (k)  − 1] . 
In the second part, the firm determines the best contract among the set of con-
tracts such that the firm will reject the bailout ex post. Let  X( ε b ,  d b ) denote the set 
of contracts such that the bailout offer  ( ε b ,  d b ) is rejected in that  δ(x, π)  = 0 . The 
contracting problem anticipating rejection, the rejection contracting problem, is
(30)  W(π)  =  sup 
x∈X( ε b ,  d b )
   [U( p,  ε ∗ ) − τ] g(k)  + ω − k,  
subject to the associated implementability constraint
(31)  [ f ( p,  ε ∗ ) − τ ] g(k)  ≥ k, 
where  U( p,  ε ∗ ) is given in (21) and  f ( p,  ε ∗ ) is given in (20).
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The individual firm’s problem is to choose the contract that gives the larger sur-
plus of the acceptance contracting problem (28) and the rejection contracting prob-
lem (30), and we assume that if these surpluses are tied, the firm chooses (28). We 
refer to this combined problem as the bailout contracting problem.
When the solution to the acceptance contracting problem is preferred and 
d( ε b ) ≤  d b , firms can structure their contracts to make sure that the firm will accept 
the bailout offer ex post by choosing any  ε ∗ such that  ε ∗ ≥  ε b and  d( ε ∗ ) ≤  d b .6
It will turn out that in equilibrium, distressed firms accept the bailout offer so that 
the solution to the acceptance contracting problem (30) dominates the solution to 
the rejection contracting problem (28). Nonetheless, the rejection contracting prob-
lem plays a key role in determining the set of equilibria. This problem implies that 
the equilibrium bailout offer must be sufficiently generous so that the manager and 
the financial intermediary do not have an incentive to design a contract under which 
they will reject the bailout ex post.
A bailout equilibrium consists of strategies for managers, the financial interme-
diary, and the bailout authority that satisfy  (i) representativeness in that the solution 
to the individual contracting problem  x coincides with the representative contract  x R ; 
 (ii) given the policy  π , the individual contract  x solves the contracting problem; 
 (iii) the policy  π maximizes the bailout authority’s objective subject to its budget 
constraint. Let  ( x R ,  τ b ) denote an equilibrium outcome.
We turn now to characterizing the equilibrium outcomes. We can always rep-
resent an outcome in which the bailout offer is not accepted as one in which it 
is trivially accepted because it simply implements the original contract by set-
ting  ε b =  ε R ,  d b = d( ε R ) , and  τ = 0. 
This representation immediately implies that in any equilibrium, the value of the 
acceptance contracting problem must be greater than the value of the rejection con-
tracting problem and thus must satisfy the voluntary acceptance constraint given by
(32)  [ U ̃ (  p R ,  ε b ,  d b ) −  τ b ] g( k R ) + ω −  k R ≥ W(π). 
Consider next the implications of optimality by the bailout authority. Clearly, the 
payoff of the bailout authority is maximized by setting policy so that in the distressed 
state the firm accepts a bailout that cancels all bankruptcies. As the acceptance pol-
icy (23) makes clear, a bailout offer of the market value of the debt  d b = d( ε R ) , 
together with a cancellation of all bankruptcies,  ε b =  ε _, will be accepted and thus 
induces the desired outcome.
We first show that this economy has a time inconsistency problem. To see why, 
note that at the time the bailout authority makes its decision, firms have already 
made their size and effort decisions. Hence, by purchasing all the debt and canceling 
all bankruptcies, the bailout authority raises the sum of all utilities. Given this policy 
by the bailout authority, private agents will not find it optimal to choose the same 
contract as they would under the commitment equilibrium. Thus, this economy has 
6 Of course, in the uninteresting case in which the bailout authority makes a pointless offer by setting the bank-
ruptcy cutoff  ε b such that  d( ε b ) >  d b , then for any  ε ∗ either the manager or the financial intermediary will reject 
the offer. To see this result, note that if  d( ε ∗ ) < d( ε b ) , so that  ε ∗ <  ε b , the manager will reject the offer, and if 
d( ε ∗ ) > d( ε b ), the financial intermediary will reject the offer. 
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a time inconsistency problem in that any bailout equilibrium yields worse outcomes 
than those in the commitment equilibrium.
This economy also has a coordination problem in that, under a mild sufficient 
condition, it has multiple equilibria. In all of them, in the distressed state firms 
accept a bailout offer that has no bankruptcies and taxes are positive. What differs 
across these equilibria is the level of the taxes, the representative firm’s bankruptcy 
cutoff  ε R , and the payments to the financial intermediary  d ( ε R ) .
In particular, the economy always has an equilibrium, referred to as the full bail-
out equilibrium, in which  d( ε R ) = d( ε max ) so that firms choose their debt levels at 
the peak of the debt Laffer curve and taxes are relatively high. Under a mild suffi-
cient condition, it has a continuum of other equilibria in which bailout payments and 
associated taxes are lower than in the full bailout equilibrium. Any outcome  ( x R ,  τ b ) 
such that  x R solves the acceptance contracting problem (28) with  ε b =  ε _, satisfies 
the government budget constraint, and satisfies the voluntary acceptance constraint 
(32) is a bailout equilibrium outcome. Let  ε min denote the smallest value of  ε R that 
satisfies (32).
We then have the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 3: Any bailout equilibrium in the  one-period model has no bank-
ruptcy, has positive taxes, and is inefficient. Furthermore, if (32) holds with strict 
inequality at  d b = d( ε max ) , then the economy has a continuum of equilibria indexed 
by  ε R that satisfies  ε min ≤  ε R ≤  ε max , where  ε min >  ε _.
The basic idea of the proof that  ε min >  ε _ comes from a contradiction argument. 
Suppose the equilibrium has zero taxes. Then, from the government’s budget con-
straint and the acceptance policy rule, it must be that  d b = d(  ε R ) = d( ε _) , that is, 
firms must voluntarily choose contracts with no bankruptcy. Clearly, however, any 
individual firm is made better off by instead choosing the commitment contract. 
Formally, contracts with no bankruptcy and no taxes violate the voluntary accep-
tance constraint and, thus, cannot be equilibria.
Consider ranking welfare in this continuum of equilibria. In an equi-
librium indexed by  ε R , the bailout authority purchases the associated debt 
d( ε R ) . Higher values of  d( ε R ) lead to higher values of the subsidy to distressed firms 
 d b ( ε R ) − d( ε _) , greater distortions in  k and  p , and lower welfare. Thus, the worst 
equilibrium is the full bailout equilibrium and the best equilibrium solves the fol-
lowing problem, referred to as the best bailout problem:
  max 
x, π   U( p,  ε ∗ )g(k)  + ω − k ,
subject to the following requirements:  ε ∗ =  ε _ so that there is no bankruptcy, the 
voluntary acceptance constraint, the government budget constraint, and that  (k, p) 
solve the acceptance contracting problem. This equilibrium has the lowest taxes 
and lowest debt of the bailout equilibria. Importantly, in this problem the voluntary 
acceptance constraint is binding.
Proposition 3 makes clear that our economy has a classic time inconsistency 
problem in that the best equilibrium without commitment has strictly lower welfare 
than does the best equilibrium with commitment. In addition, without commitment 
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the economy typically has a coordination problem in that there is a continuum of 
equilibria with differing levels of welfare. In contrast, Farhi and Tirole (2012) do 
not have a classic time inconsistency problem but rather have only a coordination 
problem. In their economy, the best equilibrium without commitment coincides with 
the best equilibrium with commitment.
C. Improving on Bailout Equilibria
The conventional benchmark for evaluating policies in the time inconsistency 
literature is the ex ante efficient outcome that arises when the government has com-
mitment. We argue that in environments without commitment, a different bench-
mark called sustainable efficiency is appropriate. We show that the bailout outcome 
is sustainably inefficient but that if we equip a government with additional powers, 
it can achieve sustainable efficiency.
Our argument for a different benchmark builds on the idea that the bailout poli-
cies are always available to the government and that the government will use these 
policies if it finds it optimal to do so. We show that this idea is captured by a sus-
tainability constraint, as described later. From this perspective, the sustainability 
constraint represents just as much of a constraint on achievable allocations as incen-
tive constraints do. Since any allocation must also respect the incentives of private 
agents and resource constraints, which are summarized by the implementability 
constraint, the relevant notion of constrained efficiency is the best outcome that 
satisfies both the sustainability constraint and the implementability constraint. We 
label such outcomes sustainably efficient.
Confronted with an arbitrary allocation  (k,  ε ∗ , p) with associated surplus and 
armed with the bailout policies, we assume the government can always intervene 
by bailing out firms and attain the surplus associated with canceling all bankrupt-
cies. Thus, to respect the incentives of such an intervention, an allocation must sat-
isfy  ε ∗ =  ε _. In order to make this condition parallel to the analogous condition in 
our dynamic model, we write it as requiring that the value of surplus in the equilib-
rium must be higher than the value of surplus under the best deviation of canceling 
all bankruptcies. That is, for fixed levels of  k and  p , the cutoff  ε ∗ must satisfy
(33)  U( p,  ε ∗ )g(k)  + ω − k ≥ U( p,  ε _) g(k)  + ω − k,  
and refer to it as the sustainability constraint. Clearly, since the left side of this 
inequality is decreasing in  ε ∗ , the sustainability constraint is equivalent to  ε ∗ =  ε _.
A sustainably efficient outcome maximizes surplus subject to the implementabil-
ity constraint (20) and the sustainability constraint (33), which is equivalent to 
 ε ∗ =  ε _. Thus, the sustainably efficient outcome solves
(34)  max 
k, p 
  U( p,  ε _) g(k)  + ω − k ,
subject to  f ( p,  ε _) g(k)  ≥ k . No policy can achieve higher welfare than this outcome, 
so it is the relevant upper bound for policy evaluation. (Obviously, a sustainably 
efficient outcome produces lower welfare than the ex ante efficient outcome, but this 
latter outcome is irrelevant because no policy could ever achieve it.)
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We claim that any bailout equilibrium is not sustainably efficient and that the 
source of this inefficiency is the presence of the voluntary acceptance constraint. To 
do so, note that any sustainably efficient outcome has no bankruptcy and no taxes. 
In our discussion following Proposition 3, we have already shown that any outcome 
with no bankruptcy and no taxes violates the voluntary acceptance constraint and 
hence cannot be a bailout equilibrium. Thus, the sustainably efficient outcome can-
not be a bailout equilibrium.
To better understand the distortion that renders bailout equilibria sustainably 
inefficient, note that in any bailout equilibrium, the voluntary acceptance constraint 
implies that debt is inefficiently high, in that  d b > d( ε _) , and taxes  τ  are positive. To 
see how these two features induce distortions, consider the scaled surpluses in the 
bailout outcome and the sustainably efficient outcome, respectively given by
(35)  p  A H + (1 − p) ( d b +  c L ( ε _))  − τ − v( p) 
(36)  p  A H + (1 − p) (d( ε _)  +  c L ( ε _))  − v( p),  
and  τ =  (1 − p)  [ d b − d( ε b )] . Note that a marginal increase in effort in the bailout 
outcome increases surplus by  [ A H − (  d b +  c L ( ε ¯))] while in the sustainably effi-cient outcome, it increases surplus by  [ A H − (d( ε ¯)  +  c L ( ε ¯))] . Since  d b > d( ε ¯) , the increase in surplus is smaller in the bailout outcome so that the incentives to design 
contracts with high levels of effort are lower in the bailout outcome. Of course, since 
these subsidies are simply a form of redistribution across firms, in the sense that 
subsidies to distressed firms are paid for by taxes on all firms, all that happens is that 
decisions get distorted. This distortion is akin to subsidizing one consumption good 
relative to another and financing the subsidies by  lump-sum taxes on these same 
consumers: all that happens is that relative consumption is distorted.
We now turn to asking whether certain policies can achieve sustainable effi-
ciency. Consider first expanding the powers of the bailout authority by allowing 
it to forcibly impose losses on debt holders in addition to its bailout powers. This 
additional power has the effect of eliminating the voluntary acceptance constraint 
because managers will always voluntarily accept a reduction in the bankruptcy cut-
off and the financial intermediary is simply forced to accept the associated reduction 
in payment.
Specifically, after the manager has exerted effort and all shocks have been real-
ized, this authority can reduce the bankruptcy cutoff from  ε R to a lower level, say,  ε O 
and, rather than levy taxes, force the financial intermediary to accept the lower asso-
ciated payments. After that, if it so desires, this authority can purchase the debt at its 
reduced value  d( ε O ), reduce the bankruptcy cutoff to  ε b , and levy the needed taxes, 
so that the government can always engage in bailouts if it chooses to do so. We refer 
to a government with these powers  ( ε O ;  d b ,  ε b , τ) as an orderly resolution authority.
It is immediate that by reducing the bankruptcy cutoff to  ε O =  ε ¯ and forcing the financial intermediary to accept the lower payments, this authority can implement 
the sustainably efficient outcome.
Consider next expanding the powers of the government above those of the bailout 
authority in a different way that allows for ex ante regulation. Specifically, before 
private contracts are chosen, the authority can set an upper bound on the ratio of the 
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market value of the debt relative to the value of the firm and a tax on size. We refer to 
a government with these expanded powers as a regulatory authority. It is immediate 
that by setting the upper bound of the  debt-to-value ratio at  d( ε ¯) g(  k SE )/ k SE , it can uniquely implement the sustainably efficient outcomes. Here the power to tax size 
is irrelevant, but this power will be critical in the dynamic model discussed later.
Here, the regulatory authority does not improve on orderly resolution outcomes. 
We argue that this result holds because the extent of intervention by the orderly 
resolution authority is independent of the debt levels and sizes of firms in the sense 
that this authority sets the bankruptcy cutoff at a given level independent of these 
choices. In our dynamic model, reputation effects imply that the bankruptcy cutoff 
of this authority depends on debt levels and sizes. This dependence induces a subtle 
size externality that orderly resolution cannot cure but regulation can.
II. The Dynamic Model
Here we extend our  one-period model to a dynamic model and use it to study 
bailouts, orderly resolution, and regulation. This extension is motivated by both the-
oretical and empirical considerations.
From a theoretical perspective, bailouts are sustainably inefficient in our  one-period 
model solely because of subsidy distortions, so that removing the subsidy distor-
tions with orderly resolution yields sustainable efficiency. The key insight from the 
dynamic model is that bailouts have an additional distortion that arises from size 
externalities. As firms in the aggregate increase their debt and size, they increase the 
extent of intervention by the bailout authority. Since no individual firm internalizes 
the effect of its decisions on the bailout authority’s decisions, this dynamic economy 
has a size externality that is not present in the  one-period economy.
The size externality implies that an orderly resolution authority does not attain 
sustainable efficiency either. Of course, this authority improves on the best bailout 
outcome by removing the subsidy distortion.
From an empirical perspective, we observe partial but not complete bailouts. 
Our  one-period model has complete bailouts. Our dynamic model generates partial 
bailouts. It does so because reputational considerations generate ex post costs that 
depend on the size of the bailout. Also, from an empirical perspective, we observe 
bailouts only during crises. We show that a stochastic version of our dynamic model 
generates partial bailouts only during crises. The reason is that lost resources arising 
from bankruptcy are greater during crises, so that the bailout authority has stronger 
incentives to intervene in crises.
We show that a regulatory authority equipped with the power to decree maxi-
mal  debt-to-value ratios and a tax on the size of firms can achieve the sustainably 
efficient outcome. The maximal levels of  debt-to-value ratios eliminate the subsidy 
distortion by ensuring that no bailouts occur and the tax on size eliminates the size 
externality by inducing firms to reduce their size.
Important policy questions are how such regulation should vary over the course 
of the business cycle and how it should vary across industries. The main insight from 
our dynamic model is that regulation should be tighter when, absent intervention, 
the lost resources arising from bankruptcy are larger. We provide simple examples to 
show that this general insight is consistent with either countercyclical or procyclical 
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regulation. We also show that this insight implies that firms in industries with high 
 debt-to-value ratios, such as banking, are most in need of regulation.
A. Bailouts
The dynamic model is an infinite repetition of the  one-period model. In particu-
lar, no physical state variables link periods.
Setup and Definition of Bailout Equilibrium.—The timing within each period is 
the same as in the  one-period model: the firm chooses a contract  x t , the manager 
chooses  p t , the idiosyncratic shocks  ( s t ,  ε t ) for each firm are realized, the bailout 
authority chooses its policy  π t , and the firm chooses whether to accept the bailout 
offer.
To focus attention on the dynamic incentive problem of the bailout authority, we 
assume that past policies of the bailout authority are observable but that past actions 
of private agents are not. In particular, we assume that managers are anonymous 
in the sense that their identities cannot be recorded from period to period. Hence, 
current contracts cannot be conditioned on the past track record of individual man-
agers, and  long-term contracts are infeasible. These assumptions imply that the only 
links between periods are strategic ones in which the bailout authority’s policies are 
affected by its forecasts of the responses of private agents in the future to its current 
actions. To capture these strategic links, we allow strategies to depend on the his-
tories faced by agents when they choose actions. (Technically, we focus attention 
on perfect public equilibria.) The histories needed to describe strategies evolve as 
follows. Let  H t be the history at the beginning of period  t and let  H t+1 = ( H t ,  π t ) .
The strategies are functions of the histories and are denoted by  x t ( H t ) and  x Rt ( H t ) 
for an individual and the representative contract, by  π t ( H t ) for the bailout authority, 
and by  δ t ( x t ,  π t ,  H t ) for the acceptance policy.
The payoffs of the bailout authority given a history  H t are the sum of its period 
payoffs and continuation values and are given by
(37)  [δU(  p R ,  ε b ) + (1 − δ)U(  p R ,  ε R ∗)] g( k R ) + ω −  k R + β  V t+1 ( H t+1 ),  
where  δ =  δ t ( x Rt ( H t ),  π t ,  H t ) is the acceptance policy,  V t+1 ( H t+1 ) is the continuation 
payoff given by the present value of period payoffs for the bailout authority starting 
from period  t + 1 induced by the strategies, and  β < 1 is the discount factor. Note 
that we have dropped the subscripts for period  t .
Given the anonymity assumption, the contracting problem is static and solves 
the analog of our earlier contracting problem for all histories. Specifically, given a 
history  H t , firms predict a bailout policy from the bailout authority’s strategy  π t ( H t ) 
and, for any contract  x t that a given firm chooses, that firm predicts its acceptance 
policy  δ t ( x t ,  π t ,  H t ) . Given these predictions, the individual contract is the solution to 
the bailout contracting problem, namely, the larger of (28) and (30).
A bailout equilibrium is a collection of strategies for private agents and the bail-
out authority,  { x t ( H t ),  x Rt ( H t ),  π t ( H t ),  δ t ( x t ,  π t ,  H t )} , such that for all histories  H t , 
 (i) given the history  H t , the contract  x t ( H t ) solves the contracting problem; 
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 (ii) given the strategies of the private agents, the policy  π t ( H t ) maximizes the payoff 
for the bailout authority (37);  (iii) the acceptance policy  δ t ( x t ,  π t ,  H t ) is given by (23);  (iv)  the individual and representative contracts coincide.
The outcomes associated with a bailout equilibrium are sequences  { x t ,  π t } and 
associated continuation utilities for the bailout authority  { V t } .
Characterization of Bailout Equilibrium Outcomes.—To characterize bailout 
equilibrium outcomes, note that optimality by private agents is captured by the 
requirement that the contracts solve the contracting problem for firms in each period 
given the policies of the bailout authority. Next, we show that the optimality of the 
bailout authority is captured by a sustainability constraint.
In our infinite horizon model, we focus attention on equilibria that can be sup-
ported by  trigger-type strategies that specify reversion to outcomes that are no worse 
than the full bailout outcomes. This set of equilibrium outcomes is analogous to the 
set of equilibrium outcomes in repeated games that are supported by reversion to 
the  one-shot Nash equilibria. (Of course, following the work of Abreu 1988, more 
sophisticated strategies could possibly support a larger set of equilibria. The results 
are similar, but the analysis is more cumbersome.) Specifically, we focus on equi-
libria in which for every history, even those after deviations by the bailout authority 
from a given policy plan, the continuation values of the bailout authority satisfy
(38)  V t+1 ( H t+1 ) ≥  V FB =   U FB g( k FB ) + ω −  k FB _______________  1 − β ,  
where  V FB is the discounted value of the full bailout outcome. This condition restricts 
the severity of the trigger strategies to be no worse than that of the strategies implicit 
in the infinite reversion to the full bailout equilibrium.
To set up our sustainability constraint, we use a standard result that outcomes are 
sustainable if and only if the payoff is at least as large as the payoff from the best 
 one-shot deviation in the current period, followed by infinite reversion to the worst 
outcome (see, for example, Chari and Kehoe 1990). To that end, consider a period 
t in which a contract  x t has been chosen. The best  one-shot deviation for the bailout 
authority is to buy all the debt in the distressed state and then renegotiate with the 
managers so as to eliminate all bankruptcies by setting  ε b =  ε ¯. This deviation yields payoffs given by  U(  p t ,  ε _) g(  k t ) + ω −  k t in the current period followed by the full 
bailout outcomes from period  t + 1 onward. The sustainability constraint of the 
bailout authority is then given by
(39)  U(  p t ,  ε t ∗ )g(  k t ) + β  V t+1 ≥ U(  p t ,  ε ¯) g(  k t ) + β  V FB ,  
where  V t+1 is the continuation payoff for such outcomes and we have canceled the ω −  k t term on each side. Substituting for the surplus function and simplifying, we 
can rewrite this constraint as
(40)  [(1 −  p t )(1 − R)  A L  ∫  ε ¯ ε t 
∗  εdH(ε)] g(  k t ) ≤ β(  V t+1 −  V FB ). 
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This constraint requires that the value of the resources saved by canceling all bank-
ruptcies in the current period is smaller than the present value of losses induced by 
the reversion to the full bailout outcome in all future periods.
We then have the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 4: Under our reversion assumption (38), a sequence  { x t ,  π t } is the 
outcome of a bailout equilibrium in a dynamic model if and only if this sequence 
(i) solves the contracting problem;  (ii) satisfies the bailout authority’s budget con-
straint (24); and  (iii) satisfies the sustainability constraint (39).
As part of our characterization of bailout equilibria, we note that the best bailout 
outcomes  (x ; π)  = (k,  ε R , p;  ε b ,  d b , τ) solve a programming problem referred to as 
the best bailout problem,
  max 
x, π   U( p,  ε b )g(k)  + ω − k ,
subject to the following requirements:  (k, p) solve the acceptance contracting prob-
lem (28) given  π , and the outcome  (x, π) satisfies the voluntary acceptance con-
straint (32), the government budget constraint (24), and the sustainability constraint 
(39).
We turn now to developing the appropriate notion of efficiency in our dynamic 
model. Since the government always has the option of using its bailout instruments, 
no outcomes that violate the sustainability constraint (39) are attainable. Since an 
attainable outcome must also satisfy the implementability constraint (20), we say 
that an outcome is sustainably efficient if it solves the problem of maximizing sur-
plus subject to both of these constraints. Let  ( k SE ,  ε SE ,  p SE ) denote such an outcome. 
Clearly, there is a discount factor, say  β – , such that for  β <  β – the sustainability con-
straint in this problem is binding and for  β ≥  β – it is slack.
Obviously, if the sustainability constraint is slack, the sustainably efficient out-
come coincides with the commitment outcome. Thus,  β – is defined as the discount 
factor such that the sustainability constraint holds with equality at the commitment 
outcome
(41)  U(  p CE ,  ε CE )g( k CE ) +  β –  V CE = U(  p CE ,  ε ¯) g(  k CE ) +  β 
–  V FB ,  
where  k CE ,  ε CE , and  p CE are the commitment equilibrium outcomes and  V CE is the 
continuation equilibrium payoff from the commitment equilibrium.
We then have the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 5: If  β <  β – , then any equilibrium allocation has bailouts in 
that  ε bt <  ε Rt and  τ t > 0 for each  t and the equilibrium is sustainably inefficient.
The bailout equilibrium has two distortions relative to a sustainably efficient 
outcome: a subsidy distortion similar to that in the  one-period model and a size 
externality that does not arise in that model. Ignoring subsidies for a moment, the 
only difference between the contracting problem in a bailout equilibrium and the 
sustainably efficient outcome is that the contracting problem lacks the sustainability 
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constraint. This difference induces an externality because firms do not internalize 
that their choices of size affect the sustainability constraint.
To understand the nature of this externality, imagine starting at a bailout equi-
librium and suppose that the size of all firms is reduced. The fall in aggregate size 
reduces the resources lost to bankruptcy and, hence, reduces the temptation of the 
bailout authority to undertake a full bailout. Hence, the sustainability constraint is 
now slack. All firms can now increase their bankruptcy cutoffs to some extent and 
induce managers to exert greater effort without inducing the bailout authority to 
undertake a full bailout. An individual firm is made even better off if it does not 
participate in the joint size reduction. These incentives to not participate lead to a 
 free-rider problem that manifests itself as an externality.
Mechanically, the size externality arises because the  first-order condition for 
size  k t in the sustainably efficient outcome includes a term that contains the deriv-
ative of the right side of the sustainability constraint (39), whereas the  first-order 
condition for size  k t in the contracting problem contains no such term.
Bailouts and Crises.—In practice, we typically observe bailouts only during cri-
ses. So far we have abstracted from crises to save on notation. Here we show that 
we can include them in a very simple way that keeps the key implications of our 
model unchanged while generating partial bailouts only during crises. In this model, 
referred to as the stochastic incentive model, the severity of the incentive problem 
varies over the business cycle.
In this model, an aggregate shock  S is realized at the beginning of the period 
before contracts are agreed to. This shock is i.i.d. over time. For ease of notation 
only, we let this shock take on two values,  S ∈ {  S N ,  S C } , with probabilities  μ N 
and  μ C . We refer to the state  S N as normal times and the state  S C as crisis times. This 
shock affects the probability of the healthy idiosyncratic state. Specifically, if the 
manager chooses  p , then in crisis times the probability is  p, but in normal times the 
probability of the healthy state is  p + γ for some positive  γ (with the understanding 
that this probability is  1 if  p + γ > 1 ).
To make our point simply, we assume that  γ is sufficiently high so that the con-
tracting problem under commitment in normal times has no bankruptcies. Given this 
assumption, it immediately follows that in normal times the efficient outcome is sus-
tainable. The following proposition is the immediate generalization of Proposition 5.
PROPOSITION 6: There exists a critical discount factor  β – < 1 such that if  β <  β – , 
then any equilibrium allocation has no bailouts in normal times and bailouts in all 
crisis times and is sustainably inefficient.
B. Orderly Resolution
Here we equip the government with powers motivated by a key provision of the 
 Dodd-Frank Act in addition to the bailout instruments. This key provision allows 
regulators to impose losses on creditors without going through bankruptcy. We cap-
ture this provision in our model by giving the government the power to reduce debt 
payments to the financial intermediaries without their consent. After reducing the 
debt payments, the same authority can then engage in a bailout if it so wishes by 
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purchasing the debt at its reduced value, reducing bankruptcy further, and levying 
the appropriate taxes. We refer to a government equipped with these powers as an 
orderly resolution authority. We show that the best equilibrium with orderly resolu-
tion removes the subsidy distortion associated with a bailout equilibrium but does 
not remove the size externality.
Here the timing of intervention by the orderly resolution authority is similar to 
that for the bailout authority. Briefly, after private agents have entered into a contract 
x = (k,  ε ∗ , p) with a representative contract  x R = ( k R ,  ε R ,  p R ) and the idiosyncratic 
shocks have been realized, the orderly resolution authority intervenes by setting a 
bankruptcy cutoff  ε O and associated market value  d( ε O ) . For a particular firm, if its 
bankruptcy cutoff  ε ∗ >  ε O , then its cutoff is reduced to  ε O , whereas its cutoff is left 
unchanged if  ε ∗ <  ε O . In terms of bailout instruments, this authority can then pur-
chase the debt at market value  d( ε O ) , reduce the bankruptcy cutoff to  ε b , and levy 
the appropriate taxes. It is notationally convenient and without loss of generality to 
assume that the orderly resolution authority always intervenes, perhaps trivially by 
setting  ε O =  ε R . Thus, a policy here consists of the policy of the orderly resolution 
authority  ε O together with the bailout instruments  π = ( d b ,  ε b , τ) .7
An orderly resolution equilibrium is defined analogously to a bailout equilibrium. 
In particular, any such equilibrium must satisfy the sustainability constraint (39) so 
that the orderly resolution authority does not have an incentive to deviate from its 
policy.
The best orderly resolution outcomes  (x ; π)  = (k,  ε O , p;  d b ,  ε b , τ) solve a pro-
gramming problem referred to as the best orderly resolution problem,
  max 
x, π   U( p,  ε b )g(k)  + ω − k ,
subject to the requirements:  (k, p) solve the acceptance contracting problem (28) 
given  π , and the outcomes  (x, π) satisfy the government budget constraint (24) and 
the sustainability constraint (39).
Note that this problem is identical to the best bailout problem except that we have 
dropped the voluntary acceptance constraint (32). To see why the voluntary accep-
tance constraint can be dropped, recall that, in a bailout equilibrium, firms have the 
option of choosing debt levels so high that, ex post, the financial intermediary will 
reject the bailout. With orderly resolution, firms do not have this option.
Since the orderly resolution authority has the option to trivially intervene by set-
ting  ε O =  ε R and reproduce the best bailout outcome, the best orderly resolution 
outcome weakly dominates the best bailout outcome. Under fairly general condi-
tions, it is possible to show that this dominance is strict. Here we provide sufficient 
conditions under which, in the best orderly resolution outcome, the authority does 
not use its bailout instruments so that taxes are zero. This result is not obvious. To 
see why, recall that the theory of the second best implies that in environments with 
multiple distortions, removing one distortion may not raise welfare. We have both 
7 We can think of the orderly resolution procedure as converting some of the firm’s debt into equity, which in 
the distressed state has a value of zero. This conversion takes place only if the regulator desires it to happen and the 
firm is unable to meet its debt payments. In this sense, this instrument resembles the hybrid securities proposed in 
French et al. (2010). 
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subsidy distortions and size externalities, so removing subsidy distortions alone 
may not necessarily raise welfare. Our sufficient conditions are
(42)  g(k)  =  k α  and v( p)  = v  p 1+a ,  where a ≥ 1. 
The following proposition is proved in the online Appendix.
PROPOSITION 7: Under (42), if  β <  β – , then the best orderly resolution outcome 
has zero taxes and strictly higher surplus than the best bailout outcome. Moreover, 
if   0 < β <  β – , any orderly resolution outcome is sustainably inefficient.
The argument that the best orderly resolution equilibrium has zero taxes is by 
contradiction. Suppose that taxes are positive, so that the bailout instruments are 
used in equilibrium. Consider a deviation policy under which the orderly resolution 
cutoff is reduced slightly, leaving the bailout cutoff unchanged and thereby lower-
ing taxes. Under our sufficient conditions, effort rises and size falls. The increased 
effort and reduced size relax the sustainability constraint and allow surplus to be 
improved.
We turn now to demonstrating that if  0 < β <  β – , the best orderly resolution out-
come is sustainably inefficient. To do so, note first that the constraint that  (k, p) 
solve the contracting problem (28) is summarized by the combined  first-order con-
dition (29). Using the result that taxes are zero, we can simplify (29) to be
(43)  U( p,  ε O ) g ′ (k)  − 1 −   U p ( p,  ε O ) _ f p ( p,  ε O )  [  f ( p,  ε O ) g ′ (k)  − 1] = 0. 
The best orderly resolution problem thus reduces to choosing a contract  (k,  ε O , p) to 
maximize surplus subject to the implementability constraint (20), the sustainability 
constraint (39), and the  first-order condition (43).
Note that the only difference between the problem that defines the sustainably 
efficient outcome and the best orderly resolution problem is that the best orderly 
resolution problem has an additional constraint, (43). This extra constraint is present 
because firms choose their capital freely under orderly resolution.
The logic of the proof that any orderly resolution outcome is sustainably inef-
ficient if  0 < β <  β – is as follows. If  β <  β – the sustainability constraint binds. If 
0 < β then a positive amount of resources is lost to bankruptcy. When both of these 
conditions hold, the combined  first-order condition in the sustainably efficient out-
come does not satisfy (43), so that the orderly resolution outcomes are sustainably 
inefficient.
Next, if  β = 0, no resources are lost to bankruptcy and our dynamic model effec-
tively collapses to our  one-period model. Here the best orderly resolution equi-
librium is sustainably efficient. The reason is that here, altering the size does not 
change the incentives of the orderly resolution authority to intervene. Hence, in 
this case there is no size externality and the best orderly resolution equilibrium is 
sustainably efficient.
In Figure 2 we compare the properties of the best bailout equilibrium, the 
best orderly resolution equilibrium, the sustainably efficient outcome, and the 
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 commitment outcome. Panel A illustrates our theoretical ranking of welfare. The 
order from highest to lowest is commitment, then sustainably efficient, then best 
orderly resolution, then best bailout. Panels B and D illustrate that the rankings for 
the bankruptcy cutoff and effort follow that of welfare. Panel C shows that although 
size is largest under commitment, the rankings of size for the three economies with-
out commitment are in reverse order compared with the rankings for welfare. That 
is, in the best bailout equilibrium, firms are the largest; in the sustainably efficient 
outcome, firms are the smallest.
C. Optimal Regulation
Here we equip the government with the power to regulate firms ex ante. This 
government retains its ex post bailout powers. Clearly, if a government could sim-
ply dictate the terms of private contracts, it could trivially achieve sustainable effi-
ciency. Instead, we limit the government’s ex ante powers to an upper bound on the 
 debt-to-value ratio and a tax on size. We refer to a government with such powers 
in addition to its bailout instruments as a regulatory authority. We will show that 
the ex ante powers alone implement sustainably efficient outcomes and the bailout 
instruments are not used.
β
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Best orderly resolution
Best bailout
Panel A. Surplus
U
β¯
Commitment
Sustainably efficient
Best orderly resolution
Best bailout
Panel B. Bankruptcy cutoff
Commitment
Best bailout
Best orderly resolution
Sustainably efficient
Panel C. Size
k
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Sustainably efficient
Best orderly resolution
Best bailout
Panel D. Effort
p
ϵ∗
ββ¯
ββ¯ββ¯
Figure 2. Comparing Equilibrium Outcomes in the Dynamic Model
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We model the upper bound on the  debt-to-value ratio as a constraint on contracts 
of the form
(44)  d(  ε ∗ ) _
k
 ≤ v. 
We model the tax on size as follows. A financial intermediary that enters into a 
contract that specifies a size of  k for the firm is required to pay a tax  θk to the reg-
ulatory authority. The tax proceeds are then distributed in a lump-sum fashion to 
managers, each of whom receives  T .
We will show that for a suitably chosen regulatory policy  (v, θ, T ) , the bailout 
instruments  ( d b ,  ε b , τ) will not be used. Assuming that the bailout instruments are 
not used, consider the contracting problem for a given regulatory policy  (v, θ, T ) ,
(45)  max 
k,  ε ∗ , p
  U( p,  ε ∗ )g(k)  + ω + T − (1 + θ) k ,
subject to (44) and an implementability constraint with taxes and transfers
(46)  f ( p,  ε ∗ )g(k)  + T ≥ (1 + θ) k. 
To understand the objective function in (45), note that together the financial inter-
mediary and the manager pay a tax  θk to the regulatory authority and receive a 
 lump-sum transfer of  T . To understand (46), recall that the left side of this constraint 
is the output of the firm minus the payments to the manager, and the right side is the 
amount invested by the intermediary including taxes. Since the manager receives a 
lump-sum payment of  T from the regulatory authority, the information rents of the 
manager can be reduced by  T . (See the online Appendix for details.) Since the reg-
ulatory authority must redistribute the tax proceeds to the managers, in equilibrium 
the policy must satisfy the regulatory budget constraint  T = θk .
A regulatory equilibrium without bailouts consists of a contract  x and a policy 
(v, θ, T ) such that ( i)  x solves (45) and ( ii) the policy satisfies the regulatory budget 
constraint.
In the next proposition, we provide sufficient conditions under which the sus-
tainably efficient outcome can be implemented as a regulatory equilibrium without 
bailouts.
PROPOSITION 8: If productivity in the healthy state,  A H , is sufficiently large, 
g(k)  =  k α , and  v′′( p) is bounded above, the sustainably efficient outcomes can be 
implemented as a regulatory equilibrium without bailouts.
D. Regulation over the Business Cycle
Here we ask whether ex ante regulation should vary over the course of the busi-
ness cycle. To do so, we consider a stochastic model and allow for a variety of 
aggregate shocks. We establish the general result that regulation should be tighter 
when, absent intervention, the lost resources arising from bankruptcy are larger. 
Translating this general result into specific implications for the cyclicality of policy, 
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however, depends on the detailed specification of how the shocks affect outcomes. 
We show that with one specification, lost resources are highest in recessions, so that 
countercyclical regulation is optimal; that is, the optimal ex ante debt and size limits 
become tighter during recessions. In another specification, lost resources are highest 
in booms, so that procyclical regulation is optimal; that is, the optimal ex ante debt 
and size limits become tighter during booms.
Let the aggregate shock  S be i.i.d. over time and let the probability of shock  S be 
μ(S) . In each period, the aggregate shock is realized before all other decisions, and 
the rest of the timing is the same as before. This shock can affect the probability of 
the healthy idiosyncratic states, now given by  p(S), as well as the productivities in 
the healthy and distressed states, now given by  A H (S) ,  A L (S), g(k(S), S) and on the 
return to the storage technology  ρ(S). 
Let  U(p(S),  ε ∗ (S), S) denote the surplus in state  S . The best sustainable outcome 
solves the analog of that in the deterministic model. The pattern of regulation in 
response to aggregate shocks clearly depends on the binding pattern of the sustain-
ability constraint given by
(47)  U( p(S),  ε ∗ (S), S) +  β  ∑  S ′  μ( S ′ )U( S ′ )  ___________
1 − β ≥ U( p(S),  ε ¯, S) +  
β  ∑  S ′  μ( S ′ )  U FB ( S ′ )  _____________ 
1 − β . 
Here  U(S) denotes the surplus in state  S and  U FB (S) denotes the surplus in the full 
bailout outcome in state  S . Rearranging the sustainability constraint and using the 
expressions for surplus, we obtain that
(48)   β  ∑  S ′  μ( S ′ ) [ U( S ′ ) −  U s ( S ′ ) ]   ___________________
1 − β 
   ≥ (1 − p(S)) (1 − R)  A L (S) g(k(S))  ∫  ε ¯ ε 
∗ (S) ε dH(ε). 
The left side of (48) is a constant independent of the current state  S, and the right 
side of (48) equals the lost resources due to bankruptcy. Let  U ∗ denote the value of 
the left side at this optimum. This value is the dynamic gain from sticking with the 
prescribed policy.
Let  k CE (S),  ε CE (S),  p CE (S) denote the competitive equilibrium without govern-
ment. Let  G CE (S) denote the static gain from eliminating bankruptcy in state  S , 
namely, the right side of (48). Clearly, the bailout authority has the greatest incen-
tive to intervene in states for which the static gain from eliminating bankruptcy is 
the highest. In particular, if  G CE (S)  >  U ∗ , it is then optimal to have ex ante regu-
lation in state  S , whereas if this inequality is reversed, regulation in state  S is not 
optimal. This logic immediately implies the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 9: Regulation is most desirable in states in which the competitive 
equilibrium has the most resources lost to bankruptcy.
Countercyclical Regulation.—It is immediate that in the stochastic incentive 
model introduced earlier, it is optimal to have regulation only during crises.
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Procyclical Regulation.— Consider a proportional shock model in which the 
aggregate shock  S ∈ { S N ,  S C } affects only the production function and the return 
to storage. In particular,  g(k,  S N ) = γg(k,  S C ) and the return to storage is no lon-
ger 1 but given by  ρ( S N ) = γρ( S C ) with  γ > 1 . Under these assumptions, it fol-
lows immediately that in the competitive equilibrium, the size of the project, the 
bankruptcy cutoff, and the effort of the manager are all the same in the two states 
in that  k( S N ) = k( S C ),  ε ∗ ( S N ) =  ε ∗ ( S C ) , and  p( S N ) = p( S C ), so that the static 
gain from eliminating bankruptcies is greater in normal times than in crises times 
because  G CE ( S N ) = γ  G CE ( S C ) >  G CE ( S C ) . Under the assumption that the dynamic 
gain  U ∗ lies between these static gains, it is optimal to have regulation only in nor-
mal times. In this sense, optimal regulation is procyclical.
E. Which Industries Should Be Regulated?
We use the general implication of our analysis that regulation should be most 
stringent when the bailout authorities have the strongest incentive to intervene in 
order to analyze which industries should be regulated most stringently.
We capture heterogeneity across industries by allowing the severity of the incen-
tive problem to differ across industries. The idea is that when incentive problems 
are more severe, optimal contracts imply higher bankruptcy cutoffs as a way of 
providing incentives. Such bankruptcy cutoffs are typically associated with higher 
 debt-to-value ratios. Of course, when bankruptcy cutoffs are higher, the losses due 
to bankruptcy are typically higher, as are the incentives of a bailout authority to 
intervene. This reasoning suggests that regulation may be most desirable in indus-
tries in which firms have the highest  debt-to-value ratios.
We capture heterogeneity in the incentive problem by allowing the curvature of 
the disutility of effort function  v( p) to vary across industries. From the  first-order 
condition for a manager’s effort (18), we see that the elasticity of the manager’s 
effort in response to a change in the spread  c H −  c L ( ε ∗ ) falls as  v( p) becomes more 
convex, so that industries with more convex disutility of effort functions face more 
severe incentive problems.
Specifically, we let  v( p)  = v  p 1+a and increase the curvature parameter  a to make 
the incentive problems more severe. We use the face value of the debt relative to the 
value of the firm as our measure of the  debt-to-value ratio. Thus, this ratio is given 
by  A L  ε R g(k) /k . With bailouts, the bailout authority purchases the outstanding debt 
and pays the market value  d ( ε R ) g(k) . 
Now consider the equilibrium outcomes in crisis times in our stochastic incentive 
model. Let  r D and  r k denote the  debt-to-value ratio and the size in the best bailout 
equilibrium relative to their counterparts in the sustainably efficient outcome. It is 
easy to show that if the curvature parameter is less than a threshold,  a ̂, the best bail-
out outcome is sustainably efficient in that  r D =  r k = 1 . Thus, for industries with 
a ≤  a ̂, no regulation is needed. Moreover,  r D and  r k increase as  a increases above 
a ̂ , so that industries with high values of  a need more stringent regulation on both 
 debt-to-value ratios and size. (See Figure 3 in the online Appendix.)
Next, we apply this theory to analyze which industries should be regulated. Our 
theory implies that industries with more severe incentive problems have higher 
 debt-to-value ratios in normal times. Indeed, we can show that  debt-to-value ratios 
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in normal times increase with  a . Thus, our theory implies that industries that have 
higher  debt-to-value ratios in normal times should be regulated more stringently in 
crisis times.
In practice, firms with high  debt-to-value ratios are disproportionately located in 
financial industries. The classic example, of course, is the banking industry in which 
firms tend to have much higher  debt-to-value ratios than in essentially all other 
industries. Our analysis thus suggests that industries such as banking should be the 
most highly regulated and those with sufficiently low  debt-to-value ratios should not 
be regulated at all.
III. Conclusion
We have formalized an alternative view about the source of inefficiencies from 
bailouts: even when private markets are efficient, costly bankruptcies will occur 
and benevolent governments without commitment will bail out firms to avoid bank-
ruptcy costs. Bailouts then introduce inefficiencies where none had existed. We have 
used our model to evaluate policies that are at the center of the current debate on 
regulating the financial system.
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